B. All in the Same Boat: The Mezei Principle and Indefinite Detention
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that the U.S. Government cannot "deprive" any "person … of … liberty … without due process of law." [2] This constitutional protection extends to all "persons" within the jurisdiction of the U.S. regardless of their legal status. [3] In its understanding of a person, the Supreme Court has made physical presence in the U.S. a requirement for constitutional Due Process protections to apply. In Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, [Mezei] the Supreme Court stated:
It is true that aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law. But an alien on the threshold of initial entry stands on a different footing: "Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned." [4] In essence, Mezei stands for the principle that an alien [non-citizen] [5] outside of the territory of the U.S. does not qualify as a "person" for the purposes of the constitutional protection of Due Process. Although a seemingly uncontroversial principle of territoriality simply denying the extraterritorial application of the Constitution to non-citizens, it has served as the source of the indefinite detention of the Marielitos and Guantanamo Bay detainees who have been subject to a denial of Due Process.
Marielitos: Life with Parole
In total, approximately 125,000 Marielitos arrived in Florida in 1980.
[6] Many were either sent back to Cuba pursuant to deals struck between Cuba and the U.S. shortly after their arrival or they were paroled into the U.S. pursuant to the Attorney General's authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) of The Immigration and Nationality Act [INA] . [7] In U.S. immigration law, the term "parole" has a very specific meaning. A person who has been "paroled" under this section of the INA has not been "admitted" to the U.S. despite the fact that the individual, known as a "parolee" is permitted physical entry into the U.S. following inspection by an immigration officer. Rather, [a] parolee is an alien, appearing to be inadmissible to the inspecting officer, allowed into the United States for urgent humanitarian reasons or when that alien's entry is determined to be for significant public benefit. Parole does not constitute a formal admission to the United States and confers temporary status only, requiring parolees to leave when the conditions supporting their parole cease to exist. [8] Although physically present in the U.S. amongst the general population living life with all of its trials and tribulations, parole allows the U.S. Government to regard parolees as never having entered the U.S. for purposes of immigration law and so creates a fiction; the "entry fiction"
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[9] Simply, parolees are not "within" the United States for legal purposes. Therefore, despite their prolonged and actual physical presence in the U.S., the Marielitos are considered to have the same Due Process rights as aliens seeking initial entry to the country at an inspection post. Given the ruling in Mezei, this territorial distinction is critical since it establishes that noncitizens outside the U.S. have no constitutional Due Process rights [10] with the ultimate result that a core group of Marielitos have been subject to indefinite detention.
[11] Ultimately, the legislative creature of parole and its doctrine of entry fiction have made the Mezei principle the source of the indefinite detention of the Marielitos.
However, the situation of the Marielitos has changed via a long and drawn-out process of legal gymnastics involving a heady mix of U.S. immigration law and statutory interpretation. In Clark v. Martinez, [12] the Supreme Court held that the detention of an inadmissible non-citizen should be limited to a reasonable period of time which the Court interpreted to mean six months. [13] Yet this victory may still prove a hollow. Rather than grant constitutional rights to inadmissible non-citizens, the Court went to pains to explicitly avoid deciding the case on constitutional grounds. Rather, the Court decided on the grounds of the statutory interpretation of an immigration law; 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) of the INA. [14] Prior to Martinez, the Supreme Court considered § 1231(a)(6) in Zadvydas v. Davis and whether it authorized the Government to indefinitely detain an admitted non-citizen who had been ordered removed but where the Government could not effectuate his removal to another state. The Court found that such indefinite detention would raise "serious constitutional concerns" and so applied the canon of constitutional avoidance and construed the statute to contain a "reasonable time limitation". [15] Specifically, the Court in Zadvydas found that this construction was necessary in light of the constitutional requirement of Due Process and so it interpreted the statute to limit the noncitizen's post-removal-period detention to "a period reasonably necessary to bring about the alien's removal from the United States. It does not permit indefinite detention." [16] It limited this period where it was reasonably necessary to effectuate such removal to six months.
[17] The same statute also applies to inadmissible non-citizens such as the Marielitos. In turn, in the years following Zadvydas the federal courts of appeals split over whether or not this interpretation applied to the situation of inadmissible non-citizens. Therefore, the Supreme Court took Martinez, another case concerning the Marielitos, to resolve this split. [18] In Martinez, The Supreme Court stated that the "constitutional concerns that influenced [the] statutory construction in Zadvydas are not present for aliens … who have not been admitted to the United States." [19] In fact, mention of the Fifth Amendment right to Due Process is conspicuously absent in the Martinez opinion. Nonetheless, the Court held that since the statute applies to both categories of non-citizens, the Government may only detain inadmissible noncitizens beyond their post-removal-period also for a time that is reasonably necessary to Bush [28] that the Supreme Court ruled that all Guantanamo Bay detainees including non-citizens had the right to the constitutional guarantee of habeas corpus as provided for in the "Great Writ" known as the "Suspension Clause" which allows for individuals to challenge the legality of their detention. [29] In making this determination, the Court noted that the Constitution's extraterritorial application depends on "objective factors and practical concerns" [30] including: "(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the writ. Guantanamo Bay detainees to challenge the legality of their detention, habeas courts lack the authority absent the enactment of an authorizing statute to compel the transfer of a non-citizen detainee into the U.S. The D.C. Circuit found this to be the case even if the detainees are found to be unlawfully held and the government has been unable to secure their release to a foreign state. [35] The D.C. Circuit denied their release on a number of grounds but of significance here it gave its decision based on the long standing jurisprudence that underpins Mezei; the jurisprudence that constitutional protections do not apply to non-citizens outside of the U.S. The D.C. Circuit noted that "[t]he due process clause cannot support the court's order of release Decisions of the Supreme Court and of this court … hold that the due process clause does not apply to aliens without property or presence in the sovereign territory of the United States." [36] In essence, the court applied the Mezei principle that has made the Marielitos subject to indefinite detention to the non-citizen Guantanamo Bay detainees which denies them the constitutional protections of Due Process and rather posits that , "[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned." [37] The Supreme Court has yet to rule if any other constitutional protections other than habeas corpus apply to the Guantanamo Bay detainees as it vacated the decision to review the Kiyemba case as other countries agreed to take the petitioners. [38] In turn, this victory like that of the Marielitos is a limited and tenuous at best for the 171 individuals that remain at Guantanamo Bay. [39] C
. The Legal Lacuna and Its Progeny
Ostensibly, the Mezei principle that constitutional protections do not apply to non-citizens outside of the U.S. has created this legal lacuna that both the Marielitos and Guantanamo Bay detainees find themselves thrown into; a lacuna where the U.S. Government has been allowed to wage a successful campaign of indefinite detention by denying both groups access to the protections of the U.S. Constitution. [40] Yet, a deeper and more fundamental concern is at work which accounts for this denial of human rights; a policy of judicial deference to the Executive and Congress. The indefinite detention of these seemingly disparate groups ultimately demonstrates not simply judicial restraint but judicial deference to political choices even at the cost of sacrificing the denial of liberty; a sacrifice that is grossly contrary to the fundamental American
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As aforementioned, in Kiyemba the court denied the release of Guantanamo Bay detainees where the Government could not effectuate their removal despite their successful habeas corpus challenge on the long standing jurisprudence that underpins Mezei that constitutional protections do not apply to non-citizens outside of the U.S. [42] However, the court also explicitly relied on Mezei for its decision noting that it lacked the authority to order a prisoner held outside of the U.S. into the country absent a law to that effect.
It "is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized by law, to review the determination of the political branch of the Government to exclude a given alien." With respect to these seventeen petitioners, the Executive Branch has determined not to allow them to enter the United States. The critical question is: what law "expressly authorized" the district court to set aside the decision of the Executive Branch and to order these aliens brought to the United States and released in Washington, D.C.? The district court cited no statute or treaty authorizing its order, and we are aware of none. [43] In turn, Kiyemba emerges as a stark example of judicial deference to the Executive and Congress. This has the effect of making the courts mere purveyors of advisory opinions which at least raises the specter of a constitutional concern as it is widely understood that Article III section 2 of the Constitution forbids the judicial branch to issue such opinions. [44] Of course, if it turns out that … the executive branch does not release winning petitioners because no other country will accept them and they will not be released into the United States, then the whole process leads to virtual advisory opinions. It becomes a charade prompted by the Supreme Court's defiant -if only theoreticalassertion of judicial supremacy, see Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723, sustained by posturing on the part of the Justice Department, and providing litigation exercise for the detainee bar. [45] Furthermore in announcing the principle that the courts cannot admit a non-citizen into the U.S. by its own authority, the Kiyemba court claws back the fragile constitutional gains that the Supreme Court offered non-citizen detainees in Boumediene by eviscerating the constitutional protection of habeas corpus. [46] And so we ask again: what law authorized the district court to order the government to bring petitioners to the United States and release them here? It cannot be that because the court had habeas jurisdiction, it could fashion the sort of remedy petitioners desired. The courts in Knauff and in Mezei also had habeas jurisdiction,
Volume 2, Issue 3 --Law Special Edition yet in both cases the Supreme Court held that the decision whether to allow an alien to enter the country was for the political departments, not the Judiciary. [47] In doing so the court has ignored that habeas corpus is both a right and a remedy and without the latter the former becomes meaningless. Indeed, its entire function is to prevent unlawful imprisonment springing from an excess of Executive power [48] by offering the right to challenge the legality of detention and the typical remedy has been release. [49] In turn, Kiyemba violates one of the law's most basic tenets that for every wrong there must be a remedy. As Chief Justice Marshall noted in Marbury v Madison, "[t]he government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right." [50] However, in Marbury the Supreme Court could not issue a remedy as it lacked the jurisdiction; [51] demonstrating that in reality not every wrong receives a remedy as there remain the practical requirements of proof of the violation of a right and the power to exercise jurisdiction in order to issue relief.
The court in Kiyemba achieved this ability to deny a remedy by asserting that it lacked the later; the power to exercise jurisdiction by placing it within the strictures of immigration law. [52] However, this ignores that it is inappropriate to apply the framework of immigration law to the detainees in this particular case as well as the other Guantanamo Bay detainees as they were brought to Guantanamo against their will rather than voluntarily as is typical in immigration cases. [53] Moreover, even if this does not distinguish the Guantanamo Bay detainees and so they are properly within the immigration context, it also ignores the developments in immigration law in Zadvydas [54] and more appropriately Martinez, albeit is a precarious victory, where the Supreme Court through statutory interpretation ruled that where the Government cannot effectuate the removal of an inadmissible non-citizen indefinite detention is not permissible. [55] Finally, regardless of the immigration context, the court in Kiyemba undoubtedly after Boumediene has jurisdiction over the issue as this federal district courts possesses habeas jurisdiction; the power to determine whether the detainment of an individual is lawful or an abuse of Executive power and in the case of the latter to order the remedy of release to be free from unlawful detention. Therefore, neither the proof of the violation of a right and the power to exercise jurisdiction in order to issue relief are at issue here. However, the Kiyemba court still denied the remedy of release typically associated with habeas corpus by placing this analysis within the strictures of the immigration context. Ultimately, it is this placement that is at the root of the judicial deference in Kiyemba as it allows courts to apply the doctrine of plenary power. Indeed, the doctrine of plenary power also has been at the root of the deference in the case of the Marielitos. As regards the Marielitos, the Supreme Court explicitly refused to grant them and other non-citizens in a similar position any constitutional rights but rather decided Martinez on
Volume 2, Issue 3 --Law Special Edition the grounds of the statutory interpretation of an immigration law consistent with the doctrine of plenary power. [56] The plenary power doctrine refers to the idea that something is so "exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference." [57] Undoubtedly, this doctrine seeks to preserve the sovereign role of the political branches and has been used extensively in immigration law tracing its roots to The Chinese Exclusion Case where the Supreme Court fleshed out its reasoning for its application to immigration noting:
The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of any one.
[58]
The Court further added that any issues with the policy should be directed toward the political branches of the Government as it is solely entrusted with power over these matter and so it not a question for judicial determination [59] ; thus establishing a hands off approach by the courts in the realm of immigration and in particular questions concerning the exclusion of non-citizens. However, this deference of the plenary doctrine relies on too simplistic of a conception of the institutional competence of the different branches of government. The Constitution does grant supreme power to Congress over immigration but not exclusive power. [60] In fact the Supreme Court has recognized that it is not possible "to delineate a fixed and precise line of separation in these matters between political and judicial power under the Constitution." [61] In turn, in this "zone of twilight" [62] the balance surely must tip in favor of protecting the most fundamental of rights to the American scheme of justice, the liberty of individuals to be the free from unlawful detention. Yet, the plenary power in both the cases of the Guantanamo Bay detainees and the Marielitos seems to have morphed from a doctrine of judicial restraint out of respect for the separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution into a creature of judicial deference which has been used by the judiciary as a mechanism for the abandonment of its constitutional role. After all, the judiciary in the U.S. has a strong tradition of [63] and indeed it is one of its primary functions to protect individuals against governmental excess. However, this increasing abnegation is exactly what the war on terror has allowed the judiciary to achieve through raising the specter of security concerns and risks.
D. Conclusions
Although the above principle of Mezei and judicial deference exist in both the rubric of peace and the war on terror with the result that both the Marielitos and Guantanamo Bay detainees have
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Volume 2, Issue 3 --Law Special Edition been subject to indefinite detention, the war on terror has increased such deference. This increased deference is at the root of and is the most disconcerting of all the changes that the war on terror has worked by reaffirming a commitment to the doctrine of plenary power [64] through its importation from the framework of immigration law. The war on terror has affected such change as it offers a clear and simple framework for the courts to easily abandon their role to protect the rights of individuals against the excesses of government. Specifically, it offer courts broad and ambiguous terms like "security concerns" and "security risks" amongst other sound bites as an excuse for such abandonment which is almost unassailable in the current political climate and necessarily has increased such deference. Ironically, this is especially detrimental given that the stakes are so high within the context of the war on terror. Indeed, all one needs to do is examine how the war on terror has operated in regard to the detention of the Guantanamo Bay detainees to see how the dangers of such deference have resulted in a denial of constitutional protections. However, this importation of bad practice works both ways. The framework of the war on terror with its security concerns and risks has now seeped into immigration law which already limited the constitutional protections for inadmissible non-citizens such as the Marielitos through the doctrine of plenary power The war on terror only further makes achieving such protections unlikely. Justice O'Connor in her concurrence in Martinez noted that the U.S. Government has at its disposal, "other statutory means for detaining aliens whose removal is not foreseeable and whose presence poses security risks." [65] Namely, the U.S. Government has the USA PATRIOT Act which enables the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to detain non-citizens suspected of certain terrorist or dangerous activities for successive six month periods [66] provided that the "release of the alien will threaten the national security of the United States or the safety of the community or any person." [67] The implications of this observation are serious. The first is that international law concerns are essentially irrelevant which is not surprising given the U.S. approach to international law.
[68] Second, this seems to conflate the Marielitos who are inadmissible with terrorists as most assuredly this language is broad and ambiguous enough to include inadmissible non-citizens who have been convicted of non-violent crimes [69] and served their sentences. Indeed, in Martinez the Supreme Court all but invited Congress to take such an interpretation by inviting them to correct §1231(a)(6) of the INA to allow the indefinite detention of inadmissible non-citizens, noting that if Congress "fears that the security of our borders will be compromised if it must release into the country inadmissible aliens who cannot be removed," it "can attend to it." [70] In fact, a bill to amend the INA which would have made the Supreme Court's decisions concerning indefinite detention in Zadvydas and Martinez moot was proposed in 2006. [71] Although it did not pass, it reinforces that the limited victory in Martinez remains just that as a result of the war on terror; limited and precarious.
These developments are unacceptable. There is a strong tradition supporting the notion that the primary role of the judicial branch is to protect the fundamental rights of individuals against the
Volume 2, Issue 3 --Law Special Edition excesses of the political branches. However, with the war on terror there is an identifiable trend towards deference to the political branches even in matters core to human dignity. The judiciary must work to reclaim its role as the defender of individual rights for the sake of fundamental scheme of American justice. [72] After all,
[p]rocedural fairness and regularity are of the indispensable essence of liberty.... Let it not be overlooked that due process of law is not for the sole benefit of an accused. It is the best insurance for the Government itself against those blunders which leave lasting stains on a system of justice.... [73] The Guardian. Semantics aside, this re-branding does not change any of the issues or the analysis herein.
[2]U.S. Const. amend. V.
[3]Ibid. [10]Op. Cit Mezei n. 4 and accompanying text. [13]Ibid at 378.
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[27] "Putting Eisentrager and Ahrens to one side, respondent contend that we can discern a limit on § 2241 through the application of the "longstanding principles of American law" that congressional legislation is presumed not to have extraterritorial application unless such intent it clearly manifested. Whatever traction the presumption against extraterritoriality might have in other contexts, it certainly has no application to the operation of the habeas statute with respect to persons detained within "the territorial jurisdiction" of the United States. By the express terms of its agreement with Cuba, the United States exercises "complete jurisdiction and control" over the Guantanamo Bay naval Base, and may continue to 
